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The Complexity of the Business Network Context and 
its Effect on Subsidiary Relational (Over-) 
Embeddedness 
 
Abstract: 
Many studies have focused on the effects of MNC subsidiaries’ external relational 
embeddedness. Little attention has been given to its antecedents and especially to the 
potential effect that the business network context might have. We try to fill this gap and 
attempt to explain variation among subsidiaries’ degree of relational embeddedness. Our 
results show a strong and robust effect of the business network context -- i.e. the network 
context in which the direct business relationships between the subsidiary and its partners 
are embedded -- on the degree of relational embeddedness. However, contrary to previous 
literature, we find an inverted u-shaped relationship. We discuss our findings with regard to 
the issue of over-embeddedness and the literature on the strength of weak versus strong 
ties. 
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INTRODUCTION 
MNC subsidiaries differ with regard to the extent to which they have built strong and 
interdependent relationships with their business partners (i.e. customers and suppliers, cf. 
Andersson & Forsgren, 1996). Numerous studies have shown that such relational 
embeddedness can be a driving factor of subsidiary knowledge creation (Almeida & Phene, 
2004; Håkanson & Nobel, 2001; Mu et al., 2007) and performance (Andersson et al., 2002), 
enabling embedded subsidiaries to contribute to the competitive advantage of the 
multinational corporation (MNC) (Nell et al. 2010).  
However, despite the importance of subsidiary relational embeddedness we still know 
very little about its antecedents (Andersson et al., 2005). While both MNC internal factors 
(e.g. Andersson et al., 2005; Håkanson & Nobel, 2001; Luo, 2001; Jindra et al., 2009) as 
well as environmental factors have been proposed to be associated with subsidiary 
relational embeddedness (e.g. Giroud & Scott-Kennel, 2009; Holm et al., 2005; Chen et al., 
2004; Scott-Kennel, 2007; Nell et al., 2010)
1
 it is especially environmental characteristics 
that are often captured in rather rudimentary, limited ways. For example, a number of 
studies use industry or country dummies (e.g. Jindra et al., 2009; Andersson et al., 2005; 
Chen et al., 2004) despite doubts that the subsidiary’s host country is a relevant factor when 
investigating subsidiary embeddedness (Yamin, 2007). Other studies attempt to measure 
more directly perceptions of the environment such as the level of competition (Holm et al., 
2005; Scott-Kennel, 2007).  
While all these variables are to some extent helpful, they are at odds with the markets-
as-networks view which argues that markets can be conceptualized as sets of 
interconnected actors and that, therefore, individual business relationships are embedded in 
                                                     
1
 Firm internal and external factors have also been identified influencing firms’ inter-organizational behavior 
in more general settings (e.g. Gulati & Gargiuolo 1999). 
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a wider network context (Anderson et al., 1994; Blankenburg Holm et al., 1996, 1999; 
Halinen & Törnroos, 1998). Thus, while the concept of subsidiary relational embeddedness 
is based on the markets-as-networks logic, the environment of the subsidiaries’ 
relationships is frequently not based on the markets-as-networks logic.  
We argue that this is not only conceptually inconsistent but also critical for 
understanding variation of subsidiary relational embeddedness. For example, previous 
research neglects costs of strongly embedded relationships to a limited number of actors 
and hence the idea that certain characteristics of the network context of business 
relationships could decrease their value (e.g. Blankenburg Holm, 1999; Uzzi, 1997; 
Halinen & Törnroos, 1998). 
This paper seeks to shed light on the above. We test a model in which firm-internal and 
external factors are used to explain variation of relational embeddedness across 
subsidiaries. While we control for a common set of MNC-internal variables we focus on 
one pertinent characteristic of the network context of the subsidiaries’ business 
relationships, namely its complexity. Similar to Blankenburg Holm et al (1996; 1999), we 
define the complexity of the network context of business relationships as the extent to 
which a wide range of other actors outside the direct business relationship between the 
subsidiary and its partner exercise influence on the direct business relationship
2
. 
Our results show that there is a very robust inverted u-shaped relationship between the 
complexity of the business network context and subsidiary relational embeddedness. Our 
study contributes to the literature in the following way: 
First, we add to the literature on business networks and the markets-as-networks 
approach. Our measurement of the complexity of the business network context is based on 
                                                     
2
 Note that Blankenburg Holm et al. (1996, 1999) name their construct “Business Network Connection” and it 
is based only on directly connected relationships. 
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the markets-as-networks view and we suggest that this measure is complementary to 
frequently used perceptual measures of abstract environmental characteristics. Our data 
shows that the business network context is of high importance for understanding variation 
in subsidiary relational embeddedness (cf. Blankenburg Holm et al., 1999; Halinen & 
Törnroos, 1998; Anderson et al., 1994). 
Second, the curvilinear relationship that we find adds to the discussion on the strength 
of weak vs. strong ties and the notion of over-embeddedness (Uzzi, 1997; Hansen, 1999; 
Granovetter, 1973). The finding contrasts with previous research reporting a positive linear 
relationship between environmental threats and relational strength (Gulati, 1995; Beckman 
et al., 2004; Blankenburg Holm et al., 1999). In fact, subsidiaries and their partners seem to 
avoid situations of relational over-embeddedness in response to very high complexity in the 
business network context. Thus, very strong relationships to a limited set of external 
partners seem to lose value when situated in a very complex context.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First, we review the literature and 
develop our concept of environmental complexity based on the markets-as-networks view. 
Then we develop our hypothesis, describe our empirical setting as well as 
operationalizations, and provide details on our estimations. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT 
Throughout the paper we focus on business network relationships. Such relationships 
describe the exchange relations between two firms doing business with each other, i.e. 
between buyers and suppliers (cf. Blankenburg Holm et al., 1999). They are of considerable 
importance, since they are often long-lasting (Håkansson, 1982) and very influential on the 
strategies of the exchange partners (Blankenburg Holm, 1999).  
 6 
From a focal firm’s perspective, business network relationships are maintained with a 
rather limited number of partners (Håkansson, 1989). It is argued that they are to a varying 
extent embedded relationships, i.e. relationships that have developed from arm’s-length to 
close, interdependent relationships characterized by mutual adaptation and trust 
(Håkansson, 1982; McEvily & Marcus, 2005; Dyer & Singh, 1998). This is a result of a 
process where firms make relationship-specific investments (Håkansson and Snehota, 
1995) and integrate and link their activities to each other (Håkansson and Johanson, 1992; 
Håkansson and Snehota, 1995). 
The term embeddedness goes back to social network research which formulated the 
idea that economic exchange is socially embedded (Granovetter, 1985). It is argued that the 
joint commitment and trust builds the basis for higher-order knowledge-sharing and 
collaborative routines among the two partners which are necessary to acquire, combine, and 
build resources and capabilities (Blankenburg Holm et al., 1999; Uzzi, 1997). The 
relational adaptation yields the ability to exchange rather tacit, “fine-grained” (Uzzi, 1997), 
and socially embedded knowledge. Investing into and developing such strong relationships 
with external partner firms is therefore considered to be a source of competitive advantage 
(Dyer & Singh, 1998).  
In the context of the MNC, researchers have used above-mentioned concepts and 
investigated the business relationships of MNC subsidiaries with their most important 
customers and suppliers (e.g. Andersson et al., 2001, 2002). Several studies investigated the 
average extent to which subsidiaries operate with embedded business relationships, often 
called “subsidiary relational embeddedness” (e.g. Andersson et al. 2007) and there is 
now substantial evidence that subsidiary relational embeddedness is conducive to 
knowledge generation and innovation as well as subsidiary performance (e.g.; Mu et al., 
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2007; Almeida & Phene, 2004). Thus, subsidiary relational embeddedness is of high 
importance to the MNC which is in line with research seeing networks as important 
strategic resources (e.g. Dyer & Singh, 1998; Gulati et al., 2000). 
 
Antecedents of Subsidiary Relational Embeddedness 
Given its importance, surprisingly few attempts have been made to study antecedents 
of subsidiary relational embeddedness (Andersson et al., 2005) and many studies have not 
integrated both firm-internal as well as external factors that might have an influence on how 
business network relationships of subsidiaries are governed. 
A number of firm-internal factors have been identified as drivers of subsidiary 
relational embeddedness such as the headquarters (HQ) use of expatriates and the incentive 
system (Andersson et al., 2005). It is also argued that subsidiary age and proprietary 
resources have an effect on subsidiary relational embeddedness since they increase the 
attractiveness of the subsidiary to potential partners and give time to nurture the 
relationship (Luo, 2001, Håkanson & Nobel, 2001; Andersson et al., 2005). 
Beyond MNC internal factors, environmental factors received some, albeit scarce, 
attention (e.g. Holm et al., 2005, Luo, 2001). Several studies capture industry or 
environmental effects by including country and industry dummies in their studies. For 
example, Jindra et al. (2009) use industry sector as well as country dummies, others only 
country dummies (e.g. Andersson et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2004) to explain subsidiary 
relational embeddedness. Others have used perceptual measures of specific environmental 
characteristics, such as the intensity of competition, and associated them with subsidiary 
relational embeddedness (see e.g. Holm et al., 2005; Luo, 2001). While all these studies 
help to characterize the environment to some extent they have important limitations. 
 8 
Most importantly, it is argued that business network relationships of firms or 
subsidiaries should not be seen in isolation, i.e. the markets in which the subsidiaries and 
their partners operate can themselves be seen as networks of interconnected firms. Firms 
are “tied together directly and indirectly through networks of relationships which may 
extend in any direction without limit” (Blankenburg Holm et al., 1999, p. 468). This 
“markets-as-networks” approach sees markets not as a faceless, abstract thing which often 
assumes quite clear boundaries between the firm and the environment  but as a fairly stable 
network of relationships (Anderson et al., 1994). It treats this context rather as socially 
constructed (Anderson et al., 1994) with a number of actors influencing a focal relationship. 
This is the context in which individual business network relationships are embedded. It 
encompasses directly and indirectly connected exchange relationships (Anderson et al., 
1994).  
We argue that existing research on the antecedents of subsidiary relational 
embeddedness is to some extent based on and, simultaneously, at odds with the markets-as-
networks approach. On the one hand, it considers the effects and inner working of direct 
business network relationships very much along the lines of the markets-as-networks 
approach. On the other hand, it does not conceptualize the context of these business 
network relationships in a way which is consistent with the markets-as-networks approach. 
Andersson, Forsgren, and Holm (2007a, p. 816) conclude that ‘‘the external network of the 
subsidiary has been conceptualized only in terms of dyadic relationships”. 
Using non-markets-as-networks concepts to capture the environment has strong 
implications. For example, it has been argued that in the markets-as-networks approach, 
markets do not have a nationality, i.e. that “national boundaries do not necessarily imply a 
punctuation or discontinuity in network relationships” (Yamin 2007, p. 137). When 
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relationships cross borders, country dummies become imprecise. Similarly, industries 
defined based on industry codes (e.g. SIC or NAICS) are very likely to be different 
between buyers and sellers. Using industry dummies to characterize the context in which 
relationships between subsidiaries and their partners are embedded is, therefore, useful only 
to a limited extent. Also perceptual measures of abstract environmental characteristics 
(such as “intensity of competition”) are not related to the idea that business relationships 
are embedded in a wider network and thus directly or indirectly influenced by other actors’ 
beliefs and actions within the wider network. This is fatal as recent network and alliance 
research has increased our understanding of the effect of the wider network (also called 2
nd
-
order network or the structural embeddedness dimension) on direct relationships in dyads 
(Uzzi, 1996, 1997; Powell et al., 1996; McEvily & Zaheer, 1999; Venkatraman & Lee, 
2004). Thus, what seems to be missing is an explicit understanding of the effect of the 
wider network context on the direct business relationships that subsidiaries maintain (cf. 
Halinen & Törnroos, 1998). This gap refers also to a certain neglect of the costs of forming 
and maintaining strong ties (e.g. Hansen, 1999) in the literature on MNC subsidiaries. 
Indeed, there seems to be an implicit assumption in extant subsidiary embeddedness 
research that benefits of strongly embedded relationships generally outweigh the costs 
associated with nurturing and maintaining such strong ties.  
In order to shed light on the above issues, our study is based on the concept of the 
environment as a network, i.e. the markets-as-networks perspective. In order to characterize 
the environment we focus on the particular dimension of the complexity of the business 
network context. 
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Environmental complexity from a markets-as-networks perspective 
The focus on the complexity of the environment is appropriate since it is a well-
established environmental context variable (e.g. Reus et al., 2009) which has been 
connected to network evolution (Wiersema & Bantel, 1993; Beckman et al., 2004). 
The notion of environmental complexity has been endowed with a range of diverse 
meanings (Siggelkow & Rivkin, 2005). For example, complexity is linked to the number of 
elements in a firm’s environment that the firms need to consider for decision-making 
(Duncan, 1972). The situation of high complexity is then defined as a situation of many 
dissimilar, yet related elements. Simon (1962) and Thompson (1967) focus on the degree of 
interdependence among the decisions that a firm faces as a key driver of complexity. 
Although the interdependencies of the decisions occur within the firm, it is assumed that 
they originate in the environment (Siggelkow & Rivkin, 2005). 
Environmental complexity is also considered to be a fundamental driver of uncertainty 
because the high number of interdependencies creates ambiguities and increases the amount 
of information needed for decision-making. Reus et al. (2009) conclude that in a complex 
environment decision makers are more likely to lack information since it may require the 
firm to employ greater rationality in its analysis in order to understand the high number of 
environmental elements and their interconnectedness. Furthermore, Aldrich (1979) 
proposes that the interconnections among environmental elements increase environmental 
dynamism which is unpredictable and ambiguous. In complex environments, change can 
come from anywhere, and triggers of change as well as consequences are more difficult to 
interpret (Reus et al., 2009). 
In line with the above, we define the complexity of the business network context as the 
average degree of influence from a wide range of network actors on the direct business 
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relationships the subsidiary maintains with its most important business partners. That is, the 
measure covers the extent to which decisions in the focused buyer-seller relationships have 
to take into account the interests, behavior, and strategies of other actors in the business 
network context. Thus, this definition captures interdependencies among environmental 
elements (Aldrich, 1979; Reus et al., 2009) of a great number of actors (Duncan, 1972), and 
their influence on decision-making within the dyad (Simon, 1962)
3
.  
In the following, we are focusing on the relationship between the complexity of the 
business network context and subsidiary relational embeddedness. We do not develop 
hypotheses for other variables (such as firm-internal characteristics) used in previous 
research. Instead, we are controlling for these variables in our estimation. 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
In general, complexity and uncertainty are often seen as a threat to firm performance 
(e.g. Wiersema & Bantel, 1993; Luo, 2003). Since firms suffer from resource constraints 
and bounded rationality, under situations of complexity, firms have difficulties evaluating 
the behavior and moves of all kinds of actors in the market. In complex situations, firms 
might strengthen existing relationships and hence enforce mutual commitment and 
resource-sharing with long-standing partners (Luo, 2003). The reason is that firms seek 
stability and trust in their relationships, which is more likely to occur in existing, mutually 
adapted partnerships than in new relationships (Hansen, 1999; Gulati, 1995). A high 
number of influencing factors also leads to uncertainty (Reus et al., 2009) which, in turn, is 
argued to lead to a strengthening of existing relationships (Gulati, 1995; Beckman et al., 
2004). It is a form of “threat-rigidity” response (Staw et al., 1981) since the firm maintains 
                                                     
3
 Note that we do not consider this as a measure of structural embeddedness in the tradition of social network 
research (e.g. Burt 1992) as we do not capture actual linking within the wider network in which subsidiary’s 
direct relationships are embedded. 
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its partners but increases its commitment. A firm’s relationships with a limited number of 
key suppliers and customers help the firm to acquire or jointly develop inimitable 
knowledge which is critical for competitiveness. The dyads profit from the joint trust and 
mutual adaptation, are able to protect themselves against unfavorable environmental 
impact, and profit from the knowledge networks of their counterparts (Blankenburg Holm, 
1999; Lindstrand et al., 2009; Baum et al., 2000; Holm et al., 2005).  
However, contrary to the above, we argue that if business network complexity 
becomes too high, further investments into a few strong relationships might be too risky or 
costly, i.e. we explicitly take the costs of maintaining strong relationships into account. 
First, building and nurturing direct relationships is costly and requires substantial 
managerial resources (Chen et al., 2004), and maintaining strong ties is more costly than 
weak ones (Hansen, 1999). It requires frequent visits, discussions, and managerial attention 
(cf. Andersson et al., 2005). The higher the complexity of the business network context the 
more the subsidiary and its partners need to allocate their scarce attention to this context in 
order to understand what kind of influence these actors have and if this influence is critical 
which requires consideration. Assuming that such managerial capacity is limited, additional 
influence and interference from the context will gradually demand more and more 
managerial capacity which, in the end, takes away managerial resources needed to nurture 
the individual dyads. 
Second, the subsidiary (and its partners) might fear potential sunk costs when investing 
more into the maintenance and nurturing of the relationships while other actors 
fundamentally influence the exchange process. High levels of complexity reflect a situation 
of ambiguities and lack of information (Reus et al., 2009). Cautious actors would then 
avoid a situation of further investing into an existing relationship when it is unclear if it 
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pays off in the future. For example, alternative suppliers might influence the exchange 
relationship by strongly decreasing their prices which could lead to a termination of the 
relationship with the supplier, i.e. sunk costs occur. 
Third, the subsidiaries and their partners might fear over-embeddedness. Over-
embeddedness refers to the idea that a network might be too closed and interconnected to 
allow for important novel information to get introduced into the network. This can lead to 
the non-survival of entire networks (Uzzi, 1997). Strengthening a limited number of 
existing partnerships under conditions of very high complexity runs counter the firms’ need 
for flexibility (Haagedorn, 2006). Firms would rather invest more in exploring new, 
probably weak(er) relationships which yield additional, potentially non-redundant 
information (Hansen, 1999). The reason is that high relational embeddedness between 
subsidiaries and a partner constrain action severely since the reciprocity makes the 
relationships binding (Hansen, 1999). Strong reciprocity means that the subsidiaries lose 
some autonomy regarding their actions because they have to, for example, provide more 
help to the partner or give more managerial attention to relational issues. Thus, subsidiaries 
might end up spending a lot of time with their partners cutting in potential exploration and 
initiation of new relationships. It is also claimed that high relational embeddedness might 
start out yielding non-redundant information but that, over time, the frequent and close 
interaction taking place in highly embedded ties introduce the subsidiary to connected 
partners of their direct partners. This increases the likelihood of an increasingly closed 
network (Hansen, 1999). Hence, strongly embedded relationships are increasingly creating 
opportunity costs under situations of very high levels of complexity (cf. Rowley et al., 
2000). 
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In sum, very high levels of complexity in the business network context may lead to a 
situation in which both subsidiaries and their partners consider it too risky and/or too costly 
maintaining or further increasing the relation specific investments, i.e. embeddedness, in 
their limited number of most important relationships. Therefore: 
Hypothesis: There is an inverted u-shaped relationship between the complexity of the 
business network context and the subsidiary’s relational embeddedness. 
METHODS 
Sample and research process 
The sample of our study is based on 20 Swedish firms
4
 from a variety of industries, 
such as pulp & paper, telecommunications, petrochemicals, hard materials, power systems, 
machine equipment and transportation. These firms were selected because we wanted to 
limit home-country variation (since firms from different countries, e.g. Japan vs. US, might 
exhibit different preferences for governance styles) and type of sector variance (e.g. 
financial sector firms can be expected to act differently with regard to external networks). 
Furthermore, since we were interested in true MNCs, we made sure that all firms were 
highly international. Roughly 75% of them had more than half of their employees outside 
the home country. Approaching such a specific set of firms first, in order to get subsidiary-
level data in a second step, is a common approach in international management (cf. 
Andersson et al., 2002; Ciabuschi, 2004).  
From these firms, data on 97 subsidiaries were collected between 1990 and 1994
5
. 
Hence, on average, approximately five subsidiaries were studied in each firm. We selected 
                                                     
4
 Most of the firms belong to larger conglomerates but they are very independent entities focused on a 
particular industry. Therefore, we refer to these entities as firms and not as “divisions” of the 13 
conglomerates in our study. 
5
 Note that actual sample size used in the estimations is slightly smaller due to missing values. 
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the subsidiaries based on the following considerations. First, we wanted our subsidiaries to 
be highly representative of the firms’ businesses. Therefore, we first asked firm-level 
managers to help us identify such subsidiaries in every firm. By consequence, the 
subsidiaries in our sample accounted on average for more than 50% of the firm’s total 
operations (in terms of the number of employees). The actual number of subsidiary 
employees ranges from 50 to over 5,000. Second, we were interested in established 
subsidiaries that had responsibility for their own production and sales. This ensured that the 
subsidiaries were quite independent in decision-making concerning external relational 
embeddedness. Table 1 shows some information on the firms. 
---- Table 1 about here --- 
The bulk of the data used in our analysis comes from a survey based on the perceptions 
of several managers per subsidiary. Using perceptual self-assessments is a very good way 
of measuring the true drivers of subsidiary behavior as it is argued that managers will act 
rather based on what they believe and perceive and not on some objective truth (Weick & 
Roberts 1993; Day & Nedungadi 1994). It also fits the markets-as-networks view of rather 
socially constructed contexts of business relationships (Anderson et al., 1994). Additional 
data on subsidiary country characteristics were collected using OECD databases. 
The quantitative survey data was collected via face-to-face interviews using a 
standardized questionnaire. A multiple steps approach was used with interviews covering 
managers both at the firm level and at the subsidiary level. While the firm-level managers 
were only asked to identify appropriate subsidiaries to include in our study, 291 interviews 
at the subsidiary level were carried out to collect the data for our 97 subsidiaries (3 
interviews per subsidiary, i.e. with subsidiary top management as well as the sales and 
purchasing managers of the subsidiary). A key advantage of administering the survey 
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instrument face-to-face is that it can be secured that the target respondent actually is the 
person answering the questions. The interviews lasted for about two hours which also 
allowed for explanation of constructs in case of potential misunderstandings or other 
problems. 
The final sample composition shows good variance. The subsidiaries are located in 16 
countries. 47% of all subsidiaries are located in Central European countries (Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland and UK) and, 34% are from Northern 
European countries, thereof 20% in Sweden itself. The remainder is from Southern Europe 
(Italy, Spain, Turkey) and North American (Mexico and US). 
 
Measures 
Subsidiary relational embeddedness. Our measure reflects the investment subsidiaries and 
their partners have made to establish close, interdependent relationships. For each 
subsidiary, we asked the subsidiary’s sales as well as the subsidiary’s purchasing managers 
to assess to what extent the six most important relationships with external customers (3) 
and external suppliers (3) had resulted in two outcomes: the extent to which the product 
technology and and production technology has been adapted in the dyad. Hence, the 
measurement depicts the degree of interdependence and mutual adaptation of the subsidiary 
and its external partners compared to an arm’s-length relationship. Following Andersson et 
al. (2002) we measure the two indicators on a five-point Likert-type scale from 1 (not at all) 
to 5 (very much). For each indicator, we added the scores for each of the subsidiaries’ 
external relationships and then divided the score by the number of external relationships 
identified for each subsidiary. The two resulting subsidiary-level indicators for adaptation 
of product and production development load on one factor explaining 82% of the variance 
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(α = .79) and represent the subsidiary’s average degree of external relational 
embeddedness. 
 
Complexity of the business network context. The measure is a composite index constructed 
from a number of indicators. Similar to Blankenburg et al. (1996, 1999) we asked the 
subsidiaries’ sales and purchasing managers to rate the extent of influence other actors in 
the network have on the subsidiary’s most important customer and supplier relationships. 
The influence of the following actors that are all “outsiders” to the focal relationship were 
considered: Other competing suppliers; supplementary suppliers; supplier's suppliers; other 
customers; customer’s customers, competitors; governments, and non-commercial 
organizations and their influence was measured on a five-point Likert-type scale from 1 
(very low) to 5 (very high). We summated the influence scores from all external actors 
across the business relationships and divided them by the number of influencing actors. 
 
Control variables. We used a number of variables to control for other causes that might 
drive subsidiaries and their partners into building close relationships. First, from OECD 
databases we compiled the host country’s R&D expenses as well as the GDP per capita as 
indicators for the knowledge available in a country as well as its prosperity. Subsidiaries 
can be more inclined to build strong linkages to firms residing in such countries as this 
might represent important learning opportunities. We calculated an average for the two 
variables across the four years of data collection. Second, in line with previous literature, 
we controlled for a number of subsidiary characteristics such as subsidiary age and size 
(e.g. Håkanson & Nobel, 2001). The size was measured in terms of the total number of 
employees. We added also the average length of the subsidiary’s business relationships. 
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Size and age measures were logged. We furthermore controlled for the subsidiary 
mandate (competence creating mandate) since the mandate could have a strong influence 
on the subsidiary’s motivation to invest into local relationships. The measurement was built 
on two items which asked how important the subsidiary was for other MNC units’ 
production and product development competencies. Both variables loaded on the same 
factor (α = .67). High levels indicate that the subsidiary is a source of competence for other 
units. 
We also used the formation of the subsidiary (a dummy variable marking if the 
subsidiary had been acquired) to control for effects different internationalization processes 
could have on the embeddedness of the subsidiary. Finally, we controlled for MNC 
coordination and control mechanisms since they are supposed to have an effect on 
subsidiary behavior (Martinez & Jarillo, 1998) and they have been highlighted in previous 
studies (Andersson et al., 2005). We controlled for the decentralization of decision-
making, the extent of formalization used, as well as if expatriates are used to govern the 
subsidiary. We used an average score of five indicators
6
 to measure decentralization. We 
used a dummy variable to indicate the use of expatriates in the top management group of 
the subsidiary company. Finally, for the level of formalization we used the average score of 
two items (α = .69). It was measured with a five-point Likert-type scale asking for the 
extent to which the subsidiary relies on written manuals from the divisional headquarters 
concerning marketing activities and the overall company philosophy. One missing value 
was mean-imputed for this measure. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics as well as inter-
correlations of the variables. It also provides information on the informants for each 
variable. 
                                                     
6
 We asked the respondents to rate the extent of decision making power of the subsidiary level on a five-point 
Likert-type scale for the following decisions: supplier choice, change in organizational structure, investments 
into production, investments into R&D, and acquisitions within the subsidiary country. 
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--- Table 2 about here ---- 
In cross-sectional research designs, common method bias (or common method 
variance: CMV) is a cause for concern and has recently been highlighted specifically for 
the area of international business (Chang et al., 2010). We have integrated several 
processual remedies in our research which we believe have minimized potential common 
method variance problems in this study. First, our key variables are informed by different 
individuals within each subsidiary since we asked the subsidiary CEO, subsidiary sales 
managers and subsidiary purchasing manager about different characteristics of the 
subsidiary and the external relationships the subsidiary maintains. Hence, both our 
independent variable in our hypotheses as well as the dependent variable are based on 
information from different individuals which we combine. This reduces the risk of common 
method bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Furthermore, we protected respondent anonymity, 
and, over the course of the interview, we secured to communicate that there are no “wrong” 
answers to reduce the risk of social desirability. To further decouple the responses, our 
survey, which took 1½ to 2 hours to complete, included several sections with questions 
unrelated to this study in between those measuring the independent variables and the 
dependent variables (cf. Haas & Hansen, 2007). Siemsen et al. (2009) also report that 
quadratic effects are very unlikely to be the result of common method bias and such effects 
– on the contrary – are more difficult to detect under circumstances of method bias. They 
conclude that “research articles whose primary purpose it is to examine quadratic effects 
should not be criticized for suffering from CMV” (Siemsen et al., 2009: 13). Finally, it 
should be emphasized that all interviewed subsidiary managers were primed to focus on the 
subsidiary’s most important product or group of products. Consequently, the questions 
regarding the subsidiary’s external embeddedness in their business relationships, the level 
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of complexity of the business network context, and the mandate of the subsidiary all refer 
to a specific product or group of products rather than to the subsidiary’s overall activity. 
This enhances the precision of our research.  
Analysis and Results 
We used ordinary least square regressions to test our hypothesis. We used the robust 
clusters procedure as implemented in STATA and controlled for the fact that several 
subsidiaries belong to the same firm. This is necessary as subsidiary responses are not 
independent. A relatively high intra-class correlation coefficient of .21 also suggested 
accounting for the fact that several subsidiaries belong to the same firms. We checked the 
assumptions of regression analysis, especially the normality of the residuals and the 
absence of multicollinearity. The average VIF of 1.3 indicates low likelihood of 
multicollinearity issues as do the pair-wise correlations (Hair et al., 2006).  
--------- Table 2 about here ------- 
 
We first tested Model 1 which only includes the control variables, then Model 2 which 
added the two terms regarding the complexity of the business network context. Our results 
show that the control variables add significantly to explaining the extent of subsidiary 
external relational embeddedness. Model 1 explains roughly 18% of the variance and the 
usage of expatriates as well as the subsidiary mandate is significant. Model 2 increases the 
R-squared to 29% which is a significant increase (p<.01). The complexity term is positive 
and significant at the .01 level while its squared term is negative and significant at the .05 
level. Hence, we find support for a curvi-linear relationship between complexity of the 
business network and the extent to which subsidiaries and their partners develop high levels 
of relational embeddedness. Of the control variables, the results do not change substantially 
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with regard to Model 1 with the exception of the subsidiary size variable which becomes 
marginally significant at the 10% level. 
Robustness tests. In order to check for the robustness of our results we conducted several 
post-hoc analyses. First, we re-ran the robust cluster regression and controlled for the fact 
that several subsidiaries belong to the same conglomerate instead of them belonging to the 
same firm. Controlling for these 13 conglomerates yielded qualitatively the same results for 
the hypothesized variables. Second, we re-ran the regression while controlling for the 16 
countries in which the subsidiaries are located with robust clusters. Again, results were 
qualitatively identical for the hypothesized variable while lending statistical support at the 
5% level for the effect of the subsidiary mandate. Third, we re-ran the regression without 
any robust clusters and without control variables that showed to be insignificant in the main 
model. The results were qualitatively similar with complexity being positively related to 
subsidiary embeddedness (p < .01) while the squared term is negatively related (p < .01). 
The subsidiary size and mandate effects were both significant at the .05 level. Expatriate 
usage did not remain significant. Adjusted R-square amounted to 16.2%.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This study is one of the few studies which investigates the antecedents of subsidiary 
relational embeddedness and which takes both firm-internal as well as firm-external factors 
into account. We find that subsidiary relational embeddedness is associated with firm-
internal factors and firm-external factors. Regarding the firm-internal factors especially the 
subsidiary’s mandate and the usage of expatriates gained some support across our different 
specifications and robustness tests. Strong control via expatriates moves the attention of 
subsidiary managers back to the MNC and expatriates are – by definition – stronger 
socialized and connected with the MNC than with the subsidiary context. This prevents 
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them from putting enough resources into the business relationships with the subsidiaries’ 
external partners (Andersson et al., 2005). Contrary to the effect of expatriate control, 
subsidiaries with competence creation mandates are more prone to operate with strong 
embeddedness. This is in line with previous findings showing support for a positive 
relationship between embeddedness and learning (e.g. Mu et al., 2007). Other variables 
characterizing the firm-internal setup are not significant. For example, autonomy is 
insignificant which is in line with other inconsistent findings in previous literature (e.g. 
Jindra et al. 2009). The non-finding regarding subsidiary age is in line with our reasoning 
that – while subsidiaries need some time to build up strongly embedded relationships – it is 
first and foremost considerations of benefits vs. costs which influence how strongly 
subsidiaries are embedded with a given set of business partners. 
The main focus of our paper sets on the effect of the business network context. Our 
findings contribute in a number of ways to current scientific discussions. 
First, we make a conceptual contribution. Contrary to previous literature, we develop 
and use a measure of environmental complexity which is inspired by and linked to the 
markets-as-networks literature (Anderson et al., 1994). We argue that our measure has 
several advantages: Our measure approximates environmental complexity by measuring the 
extent of influence that a range of other actors in the business network context have on 
subsidiaries’ business relationships. Thus, notwithstanding its consistency with the 
markets-as-networks view and its inherent logic of socially constructed environments 
(Anderson et al., 1994), it is not bound to arbitrary definitions of relevant industry or 
country context. Our measure is also advantageous as it proxies well the idea that high 
complexity reflects a situation in which a high number of elements need to be considered 
for decision-making (Duncan, 1972), that interdependencies exist between decisions of 
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actors in the network (Simon, 1962; Thompson, 1967), and that uncertainty derives from 
such complexity since, in complex environments, change can come from anywhere and 
triggers of change as well as consequences are more difficult to interpret (Reus et al., 
2009). We see our complexity concept as complementary to previous research which has 
frequently used managers’ perceptions of macro-level issues such as the level of 
competition or overall uncertainty without linking these measures to the markets-as-
networks view. Managers might be able to judge how uncertain their business environment 
is in an abstract sense. Yet, our measure focuses on the idea that some abstract 
environmental characteristics might find its way to the decision-maker through the 
influence of other actors in an interdependent network. Future research could directly 
compare the usefulness of these two approaches. Furthermore, we are not capturing the 
whole network and its interlinkages from a structural perspective. To this end, future 
research could try to capture more structural embeddedness characteristics of the wider 
network such as its density or the existence of structural holes (e.g. Burt, 1992) and 
investigate to what extent this has an influence on perceived business network complexity.  
Finally, our measure is capturing in a very intuitive way that managers perceive varying 
degrees of influence from a complex business network context. This suffices for capturing 
if such influence has a bearing on relational governance. However, it would be interesting 
to analyze how such influence materializes to get a more fine-grained understanding of 
these processes
7
. For example, the influence could manifest itself in different forms and be 
perceived as positive or negative. This is another potential area for future research.  
Second, our conceptual contribution is further supported by an empirical contribution 
with strong implications for business network theory and the literature on over-
embeddedness. Our results present evidence that the complexity of the business network 
                                                     
7
 We thank one anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. 
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context is strongly associated with subsidiary relational embeddedness explaining roughly 
13% of the variance of it. Thus, we are fully in line with previous business network 
literature (Anderson et al., 1994; Blankenburg Holm et al., 1996, 1999) who argued that 
business relationships “can be better understood if looked at in context” (Blankenburg 
Holm et al., 1999, p. 473) and that “interdependence in the focal relationship is also 
contingent on interdependence in the network” (p. 474).  It was argued that the learning and 
coordination potential, and thereby performance and survival for the subsidiary, is 
enhanced by the closeness of the relationships (cf. Blankenburg Holm et al., 1999). 
However, in contrast with previous findings, we predicted and found that when complexity 
continues to rise, i.e. when there is increasing influence from other actors on the business 
relationship, the partners forming the business relationship realize that the relative benefits 
of further relationship specific investments are counteracted by opportunity costs and 
decreased flexibility. Complexity of the business network context only has a positive 
impact on subsidiary relational embeddedness for complexity levels below a threshold 
value. Differentiating the prediction equation according to the complexity variable and 
equating it to zero (i.e. setting the slope of the quadratic function to zero) renders a solution 
of complexity of the business network context equaling 1.01. This means that the level of 
subsidiary network complexity for which the highest level of embeddedness can be 
observed is 1.01. Hence, the quadratic effect captured in our model describes not only a 
decreasing marginal effect but a threshold level at roughly 1 standard deviation above the 
mean. Beyond 1 standard deviation, the subsidiary relational embeddedness decreases 
again. Since we can assume context complexity to be normally distributed, roughly 16% of 
all subsidiaries are located beyond this threshold
8
. We conclude that a considerable amount 
                                                     
8
 In fact, our sample distribution is slightly positively skewed. While the kurtosis normality tests are 
insignificant the skewness test of normality is significant at the 10% level. Due to this skewness, only 14% of 
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of subsidiaries perceive that they are exposed to high complexity contexts and these 
subsidiaries shy away from having a limited set of very strongly embedded relationships. 
This finding brings back the costs of maintaining and nurturing strongly embedded 
business relationships to the discussion and we are able to shed light on the phenomenon of 
over-embeddedness (Uzzi, 1997). In accordance with Uzzi’s findings, we show that 
relatively weaker ties seem to become more appropriate than increasing the strength of the 
already strong ties under conditions of very high complexity of the business network 
context. Hence, we suggest that subsidiaries and their partners are indeed aware of costly 
over-embeddedness which triggers a process of decreasing valuation of strongly embedded 
relationships. We advance three reasons for this behavior: resource constraints, potential 
sunk costs, and opportunity costs.  
The fact that subsidiaries are aware of relational over-embeddedness has important 
implications for future research. Our results indicate that it might be relatively unlikely to 
observe relational over-embeddedness since firms and their partners would anticipate 
negative effects and would not allow this to happen. Presumably, this is true as long as the 
complexity and uncertainty of the environment is still “identifiable”. Under such 
circumstances, dyads know what kind of environmental effects they have to consider and 
they act accordingly and reduce or increase their mutual adaptation. Yet, this changes when 
context change is radical, i.e. when a number of elements in the business network context 
suddenly exercise an unforeseen influence on the key business relationships. In such a 
situation, it is probably more likely to be able to observe relational over-embeddedness. 
Since we are not differentiating between different types of complexity and uncertainty (e.g. 
between static and dynamic complexity, or radical vs. relatively predictable change), this is 
a very interesting avenue for future research. It can also be combined with above-
                                                                                                                                                                 
our subsidiaries are beyond the threshold of 1 standard deviation above the mean. 
 26 
mentioned need to further compare perceptional measures of abstract environmental 
characteristics with network measures. 
 
Limitations 
Notwithstanding the contributions and strong robustness of our results, our study 
suffers from some limitations: First, we are not investigating the performance implications 
of various levels of embeddedness while taking into account complexity measures. We 
focus primarily on describing antecedents to subsidiaries’ interorganizational behavior. 
While this is in our mind a very important first step, future research should investigate 
performance consequences. In might be particularly interesting to investigate to what extent 
perceptions of environmental complexity correspond with some objective truth or if 
subsidiary managers systematically misperceive the influence the wider network exercises 
on their business relationships. We believe that our subsidiary managers are advanced in 
their skills to have a good perception of the environment’s complexity. Our informants can 
be expected to be very knowledgeable and to have good skill, judgment, and talent. 
Otherwise, it is difficult to imagine that they would have become top managers within the 
subsidiary firms of our multinational companies. By consequence, we believe that their 
perceptions of important issues related to their job – the management of the business 
relationship – must on average strongly correlate with objective reality (cf. McGrath, 
2001). Assuming that our subsidiary managers have a good picture of the true complexity 
of the environment, our observed average behaviour should then be the behaviour which 
maximizes performance. In other words, deviance from this behaviour should be negatively 
related to performance.  
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Second, we are only capturing the most important actors by our measure of subsidiary 
relational embeddedness. The limitation to just six relationships for each subsidiary is 
justified by the large amount of data needed to establish and assess the relationships. Our 
approach is further justified as a focus on a limited number of actors is a common approach 
in ego-network studies (e.g. Moran, 2005) and it has been shown that important 
relationships tend to be rather few (e.g. Håkansson, 1989). With our data, we are able to 
support the idea that the relational embeddedness to the most important business partners, 
i.e. those that are supposed to require the highest levels of relational governance (Larson, 
1992), is reduced under high complexity. However, it is impossible for us to investigate if 
the subsidiary is investing into a broader network via a larger number of weak ties in case 
of high complexity. We can only infer from our results that subsidiaries seem to weaken 
their most important relationships. Future research could further investigate along these 
lines and attempt to capture a broader network. However, given that defining the 
boundaries of a network is complex and poses difficulties in terms of data gathering 
(Laumann et al., 1983) this requires substantial research efforts. 
Third, we are working with a cross-sectional data set. Therefore, we cannot infer 
causality from our results. However, we consider it very unlikely that there is a causal 
effect of subsidiary relational embeddedness on the extent of influence wider network 
actors have on these relationships. 
Finally, our data has been collected in the 1990ies and one could question its 
representativeness for subsidiaries today. We do not think that this poses a big problem to 
the validity of our findings. Eventually, all our constructs are universal across time. We 
acknowledge that the average value of embeddedness or business network complexity 
might be influenced by recent developments (such as technology or globalization) but we 
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do not think that this changes the fundamental aspect of our measures and phenomena. 
Today’s relationships still vary between rather arm’s-length and more integrated 
governance, and environments can be more or less complex. Future research could replicate 
our study and validate the universality of our phenomenon. 
 
Conclusion and managerial implications 
In a broader context, our research adds to the understanding of networks offering 
opportunities as well as constraints to firms and organizations embedded in such networks 
(Haagedorn, 2006; Håkansson & Ford, 2002; Hansen, 1999). Our measure of complexity 
captures very well the fact that firms are not free to act according to their own aims only 
(Håkansson & Ford, 2002). There are opportunities since, for instance, the business 
relationships yield access to strategic resources the company does not possess (Gulati et al., 
2000; Dyer & Sing, 1998). Simultaneously, these business relationships are influenced by 
all kinds of actors in the business network context, and high level of mutual adaptation and 
“binding” (Hansen, 1999) represent opportunity costs that might be prohibitively high 
under certain circumstances. This is not well reflected in existing research on subsidiary 
relational embeddedness (Wilkinson & Young, 2002) and this study is, to our knowledge, 
among the first showing that MNC subsidiary behavior takes both opportunities and costs 
into account. To this end, it is important for managers to be aware of potential 
overembeddedness and to actively manage its network attempting to avoid negative effects. 
A higher level of such “network management skills” might require that managers increase 
awareness of interdependencies within networks, that they acknowledge that network 
contexts constrain, and that, therefore, decreasing relational embeddedness can be 
beneficial. While this might be inherently clear to many a manager, the question could be to 
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what extent procedures and routines support such awareness. Within strategy processes, for 
example, the MNC could require from business managers to support their planned 
relationship-specific actions with information regarding the environmental context of these 
business relationships. This could enable senior managers to challenge these plans. It might 
also require a more systematic collection of data and a more sophisticated way of 
interpreting environmental forces regarding the extent to which variety and change is 
needed in the network portfolio, or if increased focus on a limited set of strong partners is 
required.  
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Table 1: Correlations and Descriptives
a) 
 
Firm Size  
(employees) 
No. of studied 
subsidiaries 
Average subsidiary 
size (employees) 
Average 
subsidiary age 
(years) 
ABB Relays 4150.0 6 139.5 10.8 
ABB Motors 2700.0 5 373.8 72.6 
AGA 11000.0 3 458.3 67.3 
Alfa Laval Separation 4700.0 3 262.0 51.0 
Alfa Laval Thermal 3100.0 3 329.3 13.0 
ASG - Air and Sea 315.0 4 78.8 20.8 
ASSI 4600.0 9 455.4 60.4 
Berol Nobel 1040.0 5 140.4 4.8 
Ericsson Cable 12000.0 6 1306.8 21.8 
Ericsson Radio 16000.0 4 221.0 19.5 
Ericsson Telecommunication 27600.0 8 3005.3 61.0 
ESAB Consumables 3000.0 6 143.5 50.5 
Garphyttan Pumps and Systems 660.0 3 220.0 81.3 
Garphyttan Haldex 720.0 2 320.0 19.5 
IBS 972.0 7 123.6 9.4 
Mercuri 1000.0 7 65.0 25.0 
SCA Packaging 10500.0 4 1427.5 62.0 
SCA Graphic paper 3400.0 4 840.0 90.0 
Sandvik Saws and Tools 3200.0 4 111.0 46.0 
Sandvik Coromant 6333.0 4 2412.0 47.8 
Average 5849.5 4.9 684.3 41.0 
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Table 1: Correlations and Descriptives
a)
 
 
#  Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Sub Relational Embeddedness 1.000             
2 Sub Country’s R&D Expenses 0.058 1.000            
3 Sub Country’s GDP/capita -0.115 0.340 1.000           
4 Sub Size 0.217 0.017 -0.125 1.000          
5 Acquisition Dummy 0.096 0.049 -0.144 0.159 1.000         
6 Sub Age -0.053 0.001 0.105 0.394 -0.082 1.000        
7 Average Relationship Age -0.008 -0.170 0.030 0.345 0.185 0.361 1.000       
8 Sub CC Mandate 0.291 0.004 0.216 0.123 0.023 0.024 0.185 1.000      
9 Expatriates Dummy -0.046 -0.020 -0.349 0.061 -0.088 -0.114 -0.145 -0.188 1.000     
10 Decentralization -0.014 0.074 0.057 0.152 -0.013 0.085 0.211 -0.069 0.117 1.000    
11 Formalization 0.055 0.060 -0.015 0.205 0.011 -0.073 0.022 -0.011 0.014 0.341 1.000   
12 Complexity of Bus. Netw. Context 0.309 0.059 0.163 0.096 0.121 0.088 0.123 0.257 -0.115 0.068 0.237 1.000  
13 Complexity Squared Term -0.032 0.023 -0.013 0.203 0.146 0.136 0.037 0.144 -0.125 0.040 0.291 0.327 1.000 
Statistics Mean 2.44 16,371 18,967 2.38 0.22 1.39 2.68 2.55 0.21 3.33 2.90 0.00 0.99 
 Std. Dev. 0.82 28,817 3,012 0.59 0.41 0.53 0.69 1.09 0.41 0.90 0.31 1.00 1.36 
Informants HQ-level manager: Subsidiary selection 
 Subsidiary general manager    x  x  x x x x   
 Subsidiary sales & purchasing 
managers 
x      x    x x 
 Secondary Data  OECDb) OECDc)           
 
 
 
a) Sub = Subsidiary; CC = Competence Creating; Bus. Netw. = Business Network; Std. Dev. = Standard Deviation. 
b) Average Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D - GERD Database (millions of USD of current purchasing power parity) for the four years 1990-1994. 
c) Average GDP per head (USD of current purchasing power parity - expenditure approach) for the four years 1990-1994.
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Table 2: Results of OLS regression estimation.
a
 
 
 (1) (2) 
Sub Country’s R&D Expenses 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Sub Country’s GDP/Capita -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Sub Size (logged) 0.309 0.364
+
 
 (0.207) (0.175) 
Acquisition Dummy 0.028 0.011 
 (0.188) (0.161) 
Sub Age (logged) -0.152 -0.155 
 (0.126) (0.107) 
Average Relationship Age (logged) -0.121 -0.170 
 (0.096) (0.103) 
Sub CC Mandate 0.237** 0.199* 
 (0.079) (0.075) 
Expatriates Dummy -0.213* -0.248
+
 
 (0.113) (0.137) 
Decentralization 0.032 0.020 
 (0.086) (0.065) 
Formalization -0.025 -0.080 
 (0.147) (0.148) 
Complexity of Business Network Context  0.282** 
  (0.068) 
Complexity Squared term  -0.139* 
  (0.064) 
Intercept 2.684* 3.358** 
 (1.086) (1.12) 
Observations 96 95 
F-Value 2.81** 8.67*** 
R-squared 0.182 0.294 
Change in R-squared 0.182** 0.126*** 
Average VIF 1.31 1.34 
 
a. Unstandardized regression coefficients. Robust standard errors (robust clusters for firms) in parentheses.  
Sub = Subsidiary; CC = Competence Creating.  
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, 
+
 p<0.1. 
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